

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 06166 01 OF 02 201837Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ACDA-07

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 EA-07 /075 W

----- 018531

R 201537Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2796

INFO CINCEUR

DIA WASHDC

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

USMISSION NATO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 6166

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: USA JOURNAL ON U.S. POLITICO-MILITARY DOCTRINE

1. SUMMARY. THE APRIL ISSUE OF THE U.S.A. INSTITUTE JOURNAL CARRIES BRIEF SUMMARIES OF REPORTS PRESENTED BY SOVIET CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES ON U.S. STRATEGIC THINKING AT A SUMPOSIUM APPARENTLY HELD RECENTLY AT THE INSTITUTE. THE SYMPOSIUM TOPIC WAS "ON SEVERAL NEW TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY-STRATEGIC CONCEPTS", AND THE PARTICIPANTS WERE MIL'SHTEYN, TROFIMENKO, AND OTHER FAMILIAR NAMES FROM THE INSTITUTE AND FROM ITS SISTER ORGANIZATION IMEHMO. THEIR REPORTS ALL REVOLVE AROUND A CENTRAL ASSUMPTION -- THAT THE U.S. IS REASSESSING ITS STRATEGIC THINKING; AND AN AGREED RESPONSE TO THAT ASSUMPTION -- THAT THIS HAS BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY VARIOUS FACTORS, INCLUDING U.S. DEFEATS IN INDO-CHINA, BUT THAT THE PRIMARY REASON FOR SUCH A RE-ASSESSMENT IS THE CHANGING COREELATION OF FORCES. THE U.S., SAID ONE PARTICIPANT, IS UNDERGOING SOMETHING OF A "MILITARY CRISIS", FOR IT HAS GROW-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 06166 01 OF 02 201837Z

ING MILITARY FORCES, BUT NO PLACE TO USE THEM,
INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOVE EMPHASIZED ALLEGED

TRADITIONAL US RELIANCE ON MILITARY FORCE TO SOLVE FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS, BUT SAYS SOBERER MINDS WHO ARE BECOMING DISENCHANGED WITH THIS APPROACH ARE TO BE FOUND IN POLICY-MAKING POSITIONS ALONG WITH TRADITIONALISTS. BUT THE PRESENCE OF BOTH THESE CONFLICTING TENDENCIES HE SAYS, GOES FAR TO EXPLAIN "INCONSISTENCIES AND CONTRADICTIONS" IN US POLICY SUMMARY.

2. M.A. MIL'SHTEYN, A RETIRED GENERAL STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND CHIEF OF THE INSTITUTE'S MILITARY AFFAIRS SUB-DIVISION, SET MUCH OF THE TONE FOR FOLLOWING REPORTS IN THE INITIAL PRESENTATION. US STRATEGIC CONCEPTS, HE SAYS, ARE ALWAYS KEYED TO GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY GOALS, AND THE PRESENT ON-GOING REASSESSMENT IS TIED TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, INCLUDING CONTINUING SALT NEGOTIATIONS AND US DEFEAT IN INDOSIA (AND CONCURRENT EFFORTS DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN TO CONVINCE THE US PUBLIC THAT THAT DEFEAT WAS AN ISOLATED EVENT.) BUT THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE REASSESSMENT, HE ASSERTS, IS THE CHANGING CORRELATION OF FORCES. THE SO-CALLED SCHLESINGER DOCTRINES, SAYS MIL'SHTEYN, WERE EFFORTS TO MAKE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MORE "THINKABLE" ---TO COUNTER, HE IMPLIES, THE CHANGES IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES INCREASINGLY UNFAVORABLE TO THE US.

3. G.A. TROFIMENKO, MIL'SHTEYN'S COLLEAGUE (AND SUPERVISOR, AT LEAST IN NAME), SUPPORTS MIL'SHTEYN'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN A REPORT WHICH APPARENTLY CONCENTRATED ON A HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF US STRATEGIC THINKING. (TROFIMENKO HAS TOLD US THAT HE IS FINISHING UP A BOOK ON THIS TOPIC, TO APPEAR IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS). US STRATEGY DURING WW II AND THROUGH VIETNAM, HE ASSERTS, CONCENTRATED ON MASSIVE DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN TARGETS. AS THE STRATEGIC EQUATION BEGAN TO CHANGE, HOWEVER, THE US REALIZED THAT SUCH A DOCTRINE COULD LEAD TO OBLITERATION OF ITS OWN POPULACE, AND THEREFORE HAS BEGUN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 06166 01 OF 02 201837Z

TO GIVE MORE THOUGHT TO COUNTERFORCE DOCTRINES.

4. MIL'SHTEYN'S SUBORDINATE, EX-NAVAL COMMANDER G.A. SVYATOV, SPOKE ON A FAVORITE THEME --THE PREDICTION THAT THE US WILL MOVE FROM A DOCTRINE OF "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" TO ONE WHICH HE DUBS "SELECTIVE RESPONSE." HE SAYS THAT THE US HAS MOVED AWAY FROM A PREOCCUPATION WITH ASSURED DESTRUCTION TO A SEARCH FOR MEANS TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MORE USABLE -- AGAIN IMPLYING THAT THE US IS ACTIVELY SEEKING TO COUNTERACT

CHANGES IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES UNFAVORABLE TO IT.
PAST FAILURES IN THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN
MILITARY INTERVENTION ARE ALSO LEADING, HE SAYS TO A
REASSESSMENT WHICH PROMISES A MORE SELECTIVE USE OF
THESE FORCES AS WELL.

5. L.S. SEMEYKO, A COLLEAGUE OF SVYATOV'S, ALSO
ASSERTS THAT THE SCHLESINGER LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE WAS
AN ATTEMPT TO REDRESS CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC RELATION-
SHIP WITH THE USSR BY SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO MAKE
NUKES MORE USABLE IN THE BEGINNING STAGES OF A WAR.
HE ADDS, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS ALSO PROPAGATED AS A MEANS
OF IMPROVING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEE
AMONG THE US'S EUROPEAN ALLIES.

6. YU.G. STREL'TSOV, A NEW NAME FOR US -- PERHAPS
AN IMEHO OFFICIAL -- (PROFESSES TO SEE THREE NEW TENDENCIES
IN US MILITARY "INTERVENTION" IN OTHER AREAS OF THE
WORLD: (A) A MOVE AWAY FROM DIRECT USE AND TOWARD IN-
DIRECT USE OF MILITARY POWER; (B) A MOVE AWAY FROM ACTUAL
USE TOWARD THE THREAT OF USE OF MILITARY POWER; (C) AND
A DESIRE TO MOVE FROM A MASSIVE USE OF MILITARY FORCES
FOR LENGTHY PERIODS TO BRIEF APPLICATIONS OF MOBILE
FIGHTING FORCES INCLUDING MARINES, NAVAL, AND AIR
FORCE MANPOWER. STREL'TSOV ASSERTS THAT SUCH FORCES
WOULD BE USED WHEN US "VITAL INTERESTS" ARE THREATENED,
THEN ADDS THAT NO DEFINITION, OF WHICH INTERESTS ARE
TO BE CONSIDERED VITAL EXISTS IN AMERICAN THINKING.
HE CONCLUDES THAT THIS ABSENCE OF A DEFINITION IS AN
INTENTIONAL PLOY ON THE PART OF THE PENTAGON, WHICH BE-
LIEVES THAT THE ABSENCE OF CLARITY ON WHENN THE US WILL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 06166 01 OF 02 201837Z

OR WILL NOT INTERVENE MAKES ITS GUNBOAT POLICY MORE
EFFECTIVE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 06166 02 OF 02 201804Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ACDA-07

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 EA-07 /075 W

----- 017993

R 201537Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2797

INFO CINCEUR

DIA WASHDC

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

USMISSION NATO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 6166

7. OTHER PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING V.V. LARIONOV AND B.D. YASHIN, RECEIVE ONLY VERY BRIEF TREATMENT IN THE SUMMARIZED REPORTS. LARIONOV NOTABLY MAKES THE POINT THAT THE US STRATEGIC THINKING AND ITS FORCE STRUCTURE TESTIFIES TO IMPERIALISM'S "MILITARY CRISIS" --A SITUATION IN WHICH ITS MEANS OF WAGING WAR INCREASES, BUT ITS OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEIR USE DECREASES. YASHIN CRITICIZES THE US FOR NOT MANIFESTING ANY DESIRE TO AGREE TO LIMITS ON "GENERAL USE" (PRESUMABLY GENERAL PURPOSE) NAVAL FORCES ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

8. INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV, IN HIS WRAPUP OF THE SYMPOSIUM'S DISCUSSION, ASSERTS THAT PAST US FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES, AND THE FAILURE OF MILITARY FORCE TO AVERT THESE DEFEATS, IS CAUSING A REASSESSMENT OF US MILITARY DOCTRINE. US VOICES ARE INCREASINGLY CALLING FOR A REEXAMINATION OF THE US DEFENSE EFFORT, HE SAYS, FOR THE ARMS RACE--WHICH THE US STARTED--HAS NOT INCREASED US SECURITY OVER THE PAST TEN OR FIFTEEN YEARS, BUT RATHER THE OPPOSITE. NEITHER HAS ARMED FORCE INCREASED US
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 06166 02 OF 02 201804Z

POLITICAL INFLUENCE; IN SOME AREAS IT HAS DECREASED IT. ARBATOV EMPHASIZES THAT THERE ARE, NEVERTHELESS, ALSO THOSE IN THE US WHO ADVOCATE AN INCREASE IN US MILITARY MIGHT. AN BOTH OF THESE TENDENCIES, HE SAYS, ARE REFLECTED IN OFFICIAL US POLICY, AND "DETERMINE ITS CONTRADICTORY NATURE AND ITS INCONSISTENCIES."

9. COMMENT. THE MOST STRIKING ASPECT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS IS THE FOCUS IN WHICH THEY BRING THE PARTICIPANT'S UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION THAT THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES"

REALLY HAS SHIFTED AGAINST THE US, AND THAT PRESENT US
POLITICAL-MILITARY POLICY IS IN SOMETHING OF A STATE OF
CONFUSION IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO ADJUST TO THIS NEW SITUATION.
WHILE WE HAVE NOTED AN UNDERTONE TO THIS EFFECT IN OUR
CONVERSATIONS WITH SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SYMPOSIUM,
WE HAVE NEVER SEEN IT AS CLEARLY PUT.

10. WE SEE NO REALLY SALIENT FEATURES IN THE BRIEF SUMMARIES
PUBLISHED OTHER THAN THIS ONE GENERAL THEME. ARBATOV'S
LINE IN THE SYMPOSIUM PARALLELS THAT HE FOLLOWED
IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE DURING THE 25TH PARTY CON-
GRESS, AND IN HIS MAJOR COMMENTARY ON US-SOVIET
RELATIONS IN PRAVDA APRIL 2. THE OTHER COMMENTS ON
US STRATEGIC POLICY SEEM TO US TO BE FAIRLY STANDARD,
INCLUDING YASHIN'S CALL FOR AN AGREEMENT LIMITING
NAVAL ARMS. THIS IS A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS BEEN MADE
TO US MORE THAN ONCE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH US IN-
STITUTE OFFICIALS, ESPECIALLY SVYATOV AND SEMEYKO; BUT
WHEN WE ASK FOR MORE DETAILS ON HOW THEY ENVISAGE SUCH
AN AGREEMENT, THE ANSWER HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT "WE
WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS SUCH THINGS."
STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PFOR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 APR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MOSCOW06166
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760441/aaaabipv.tel
Line Count: 245
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 OCT 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 OCT 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <27 JUL 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: USA JOURNAL ON U.S. POLITICO-MILITARY DOCTRINE
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
To: SECSTATE WASHDC CINCEUR DIA WASHDC SALT TALKS LENINGRAD NATO MBFR VIENNA
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006